The Prospects for Democracy in the Middle East

A Critic of Larry Diamond’s Spirit of Democracy in the context of the Middle East

M.Cuneyt Ozsahin*
Cristopher Westergen*
Faiza Rais*


Simply, this critique attempts to assess the validity of Larry Diamond’s argumentation for the Middle East in his best-seller book. Of all the regions of the world, the Middle East stands as exceptionally inhospitable to democratic reforms. Larry Diamond’s analysis of this region in his book The Spirit of Democracy is incredibly pessimistic about the regions potential for change.[1] After decades of monarchical and strong presidential authoritarian rule many countries appeared to make limited reforms in the late 1990’s only to see them reversed at the turn of the millennium. Diamond’s analysis of the Middle East region and democracy touches upon a fundamental question: how should the question of democracy in the Middle East be analyzed? After a reading of Diamond’s writing this emerges as a question in itself. Diamond’s chapter begins from a moment in the Middle East where political change in the direction of democracy appears imminent but moves to a point where he concludes, “For the time being the moment of democratic reform in the Arab world has passed.”[2] These two points can be described as being pivotal in the understanding of democracy in the Middle East and trace the nature of its existence, however sparse there. For example, recent findings (2008) from Freedom House reveal a similar path: “The period of modest gains that had marked the region’s political landscape in the post-9/11 period came to an end in 2007 with freedom experiencing a decline in a number of important countries and territories.”[3] It would be apposite to infer that these two points frame Diamond’s analysis on the question of democracy in the Middle East. The bulk of Diamond’s analysis flows from the conclusion or rather observation that democracy has yet again to develop as a prospect in the Middle East.

In general, patterns do not appear to have changed much in the Middle East so far. In many respects, Diamond’s depiction keeps its validity. In Syria, a referendum in 2007 endorsed Bashar al-assad as the president for a second seven-year term. He was the only candidate. Political discussion, let alone organized opposition, was restricted and the media tightly controlled[4]. In Egypt, the strongest opposition organization which has broad public support, the Muslim Brotherhood, is still banned from open political activity and under suppression[5]. In Jordan, King Abdullah, the monarch, is still exercising extensive powers; he appoints governments, approves legislation and is able to dissolve parliament[6]. Violence in Palestine is going on in full force. The political atmosphere is not so different for other countries of the region. The only notable change occurred in Egypt. The Democratic Front Party is an Egyptian political party established in 2007. It adopts liberal ideologies. It espouses the motto Freedom, Justice, Responsibility. The party was founded by Dr. Osama AL Ghazali Harb, a former member of the National Democratic Party (The ruling party in Egypt for over 30 years) , and Dr. Yehia El Gamal, a former cabinet minister[7].The success or failure of Democratic Front seems to be hard to estimate right now.

Diamond discovers two obstacles obstructing the growth of democracy in the region: ethnic and religious fractionalization and fundamental Islam. These two factors were alleged as pretenses to rebuff and dampen public demands and justify authoritarian governments.[8] . The Middle East as a region is so intertwined that individual affairs might affect other counties in the region to a great extent. It is helpful to consider a diffusion affect of particular conflicts among different parties that not only runs the risk of threatening these parties but also overall security of the region.

In this regard, conflict between Palestine and Israel is still a central problem in the region. Sadly, the magnitude of conflict between two sides has increased rather than decreased over time. The Palestinian Authority experienced a change in status, from partly free to not free, due to “the collapse of a unified government initiated by the takeover of Gaza by Hamas” and subsequent events leading to vast amount of violence across the region[9]. Today, there is a two-headed government, and authority is shared by two parties, Hamas and Fatah, standing on the opposite edges in the political spectrum. While Hamas is a religiously oriented and belligerent party, Fatah is a secular and conciliatory.[10] As Larry Diamond, appropriately points out, resolution of the conflict is crucial to bring the peace to the region. A number of fundamentalist organizations, including Al-Qaeda, exploit the Palestinian problem, which is framed as a sacred struggle due to holy places located in Jerusalem, and occupies place in the collective memory of Arab society, in order to take support of the Arab society. One of the adjacent countries, Lebanon is also divided between pro-Syrian and anti-Syrian forces. The 2006 Lebanon War, which Diamond did not include in his analysis, is also started with the fundamentalist organization Hezbollah’s attacks on Israeli territory. Following that, three Israeli soldiers were arrested and taken to Lebanon. Israel responded with massive airstrikes and artillery fire on targets in Lebanon, which damaged Lebanese civilian infrastructure.[11] The overall result was dramatic; the conflict killed more than a thousand people, most of whom were Lebanese civilians. It is a fact that deeply rooted hatred between two different sides-Israeli and Palestinian- seems to have spread across the Arab world. If Islamic extremism is fueled by this conflict, the prospects of such dangerous fanaticism disappearing in the near future seem quite unlikely.

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Full-text is available, click here.


The Reflection Cafe thanks to the authors for their contribution!

* Graduate Student, Department of Political Science, University of Missouri Columbia.

[1] Larry Diamond, The Spirit of Democracy, (New York: Henry Holt 2008).

[2] Ibid, p. 275.

[3] Arch Puddington, “Freedom in Retreat: Is the Tide Turning?” Freedom House, 2008, p. 8.

[4]BBC NEWS http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/country_profiles/801669.stm#leaders

[5] BBC NEWS http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/country_profiles/737642.stm

[6]BBC NEWS http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/country_profiles/828763.stm

[7] BBC NEWS http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/6689025.stm

[8] Larry Diamond, The Spirit of Democracy, (New York: Henry Holt 2008) p.268

[9] Arch Puddington, “Freedom in Retreat: Is the Tide Turning?” Freedom House, 2008, p. 9.

[10 NewYorkTimes,http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/organizations/h/hamas/index.html?inline=nyt-org

[11] Edward Cody,”Israel Strikes Deep in Lebanon” http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/08/19/AR2006081900217

Remaking Turkey: Globalization, Alternative Modernities, and Democracies

In recent years there has been an upsurge of interest in Turkey's ability to create a secular, constitutional democracy within a predominantly Muslim population. Remaking Turkey provides a comprehensive and detailed account of how Turkey has achieved the possibility of modernity and democracy in a Muslim social setting, as well as the important problems and challenges confronting this achievement. Turkey has demonstrated that, as an alternative modernity and a significant historical experience of the coexistence between Islam and democratic modernity in a secular political structure, it could make an important contribution to the most needed democratic global governance for the creation of a secure, just, and peaceful world. Remaking Turkey starts its investigation with an analysis of the Ottoman legacy, then proceeds by focusing on identity-based conflicts and civil, economic, and global processes, each of which have brought about significant challenges to modernity and democracy in Turkey. It concludes with an account of the recent changes and transformations that have given rise to the process of "remaking Turkey." In this way, editor E. Fuat Keyman presents a political theory-based approach to Turkish modernity and its recent changing formation, creating an original study of contemporary Turkey.

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Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.
October 2007
Editor: E. Fuat Keyman

Table of Contents

Foreword Fred Dallmayr xi
Acknowledgments xiii
Introduction: Modernity and Democracy in Turkey E. Fuat Keyman xv
Ottoman Presence
Ottoman Awqaf, Turkish Modernization, and Citizenship Engin F. Isin 3
Reflections of European Self-images in Ottoman Mirrors Ash Cirakman 17
Problematizing Turkish Modernity
Laiklik and Turkey's "Cultural" Modernity: Releasing Turkey into Conceptual Space Occupied by "Europe" Andrew Davison 35
From Culture of Politics to Politics of Culture: Reflections on Turkish Modernity Hasan Bulent Kahraman 47
The Public Sphere and the Question of Identity in Turkey Feyzi Baban 75
The Question of Recognition
Defensive and Liberal Nationalisms: The Kurdish Question and Modernization/Democratization Murat Somer 103
A Legitimate Restriction of Freedom? The Headscarf Issue in Turkey Murat Borovali Omer Turan 137
Globalization, Modernization, and Democratization in Turkey: The Fethullah Gulen Movement Berrin Koyuncu Lorasdagi 153
The Anatomy of Civil Society in Turkey: Toward a Transformation Ahmet Icduygu 179
Amongst Other Nations
Reconceptualizing Center Politics in Post-1980 Turkey:Transformation or Continiuty? Aylin Ozman Simten Cosar 201
Turkey, September 11, and Greater Middle East Bulent Aras 227
Turkey and European Integration: Toward Fairness and Reciprocity Senem Aydin Duzgit E. Fuat Keyman 245
Figures and Tables 259
About the Contributors 263

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Barnes & Noble
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Turkish Democracy at the Crossroads

Şaban Kardaş, University of Utah

As several observers of Turkish politics concur, since the beginning of the year we have been witnessing an undeclared bureaucratic -- i.e., judicial -- coup in the making. Far from upholding the rule of law, the closure case against the governing Justice and Development Party (AK Party) is widely viewed as part and parcel of a political and ideological position that hardly stands any chance of gaining the public's approval through legitimate democratic channels. It is, in that sense, an attempt for the imposition of a particular ideology and political project on the Turkish society through extra-political channels, not unlike previous military interventions. The growing assertiveness of the judiciary emerges as yet another challenge to the consolidation of democracy, similar to the negative effects of military coups on democratization.

Democratic consolidation

As scholars on democratic transition, like Adam Przeworski, argue, democracy implies subjecting all interests to competition and institutionalized uncertainty. A consolidated democracy is one that is self-enforcing, i.e., an equilibrium in which major political actors agree to submit their interests and values to the outcome of institutional rules which are unknown ex ante. The process of democratic consolidation refers to passing a threshold beyond which all actors, including the losers, agree to avoid intervening to reverse outcomes of the political process through extra-political channels. To put it differently, consolidation alters the preferences and strategies of political actors, and democracy becomes the only game in town.

Because the armed forces are the most significant actors with a capability to overturn the constitutional order and reverse political outcomes, transitions from authoritarian rule in most cases go hand in hand, and come to be identified, with a struggle for withdrawal of the military from civilian politics and the enhancing of civilian control over the military. The processes of democratization and re-democratization are complex in nature. The factors that lead to the transformation of an authoritarian regime and the factors that give way to installation and eventual consolidation of a stable democratic rule may differ. The consolidation of democracy, in most cases, has been more troublesome than the transition to democracy.

Opportunity costs of guardianship: barriers to consolidation

Turkish democracy suffered a great deal from periodic military interventions and indirect interferences in civilian politics. Because direct military rule was short lived, re-democratizations were achieved in a relatively short time period in the Turkish case. Because the Turkish military preferred to exert its influence through indirect channels, however, the consolidation of democracy was never completed. The costs of military interventions, therefore, went beyond forcing a temporary vacation from the democratic experience, instead leaving permanent effects in their aftermath. For one, the dark shadow of new constitutional orders created by military regimes and the institutions put in place by soldiers have continued to narrow the scope of democratic politics in subsequent periods.

To the extent that non-political interference remains an option, democracy can hardly establish itself as the only game in town. This situation brings forth an important question, posed by Przeworski, which is crucial for the durability of democracy: How can losers to abide by democratic decisions and support, rather than subvert, democratic institutions. In a setting characterized by military or other non-political guardianship over a democratic mandate, the preference and strategies of political actors differ from the patterns in established democracies. As long as losers have incentives to utilize undemocratic avenues to realize their political projects, their commitment to democracy and the outcome of democratic processes will be hindered. The winners, in contrast, never feel fully secure despite the popular legitimacy they possess. Their survival instinct forces them to put a high premium on avoiding a possible intervention, which is not conducive to deepening democratization. In the Turkish case, for one, the shadow of intervention has set major brakes against any party seeking to dismantle the remnants of authoritarianism in the Turkish state system. More importantly, the use of non-political channels has served to perpetuate the limited notion of democracy underpinning the right/center-right position -- i.e., winners -- in Turkish politics.

The standard framework of analysis for politics in multi-party period in Turkey was based on center-periphery dichotomy, namely a struggle for redefining the balance of power between the core institutions that traditionally are controlled by non-elected state elites representing the state power and the peripheral societal actors, which have been represented by various right and center-right parties. As a matter of fact, the major currency of center-right parties in their quest for recognition against the establishment was their staunch commitment to a narrow notion of procedural democracy. Using the power of ballot box effectively, they made significant advances in expanding their power and influence. As the successor of the center-right position, representing large segments of the Turkish society that are upwardly mobile and increasingly ambitious to share political power, yet determined to maintain their conservative lifestyle, the AK Party is poised to encounter the bureaucratic core. The current crisis is yet another showdown in this perennial struggle.

Just as extra-political interventions prevent parties representing the state ideology from fully embracing popular legitimacy, they also relieve the parties advocating a center-right platform from the burden of going beyond a minimalist conceptualization of democracy. It is in that regard illustrative to recall the shooting game between the Republican People's Party (CHP) and the AK Party; the former threatening to refer legislative acts to judicial review by the court, and the latter referring to -- early -- elections and referenda. The idea that bureaucratic establishment seeks to constrain the demands of peripheral forces has provided center-right parties with a custom-made mobilization tool, as the good showing of the AK Party in the July 2007 elections attests. The feeling of encirclement by the bureaucratic core, moreover, has forced these peripheral sectors into a defensive mood to preserve the precious mechanical features of democratic process from bureaucratic encroachment. Democratization in that sense is reduced to an ongoing struggle to ensure the continuation of the game.

Political liberalization as strategy of survival

Democracy, however, is a moving target, and ensuring the right to contestation and participation are necessary but insufficient qualifications for cotemporary liberal democracies based on the indispensability of basic freedoms. Although the concept of liberal democracy tends to equate democratization and liberalization, these two concepts refer to two interrelated but independent phenomena. Democratic consolidation today means a transition from procedural democracy to liberal democracy.

The AK Party leadership appears to have concluded that the party's survival depends on further democratization. It also must have realized that winning elections is no longer a panacea. For the consolidation of a thicker notion of democracy, the AK Party needs to revitalize the liberal roots of the center-right tradition and go beyond minimalist democracy. Without expanding pluralism and freedom, it is difficult to eliminate reserved domains of power for social or political forces that are not democratically accountable. Such a freedom-oriented perspective also would be the best way to reconfigure the system of constitutional checks and balances. By moving away from the current system which serves to maintain a state ideology against social trends to a system that guarantees basic rights and civil liberties without discriminating between societal preferences, it could develop truly "democratic" controls over democratic outcomes. By protecting individuals and groups against arbitrary treatment by not only other individuals and groups but also the state, the AK Party could level the playing field for all. Agreeing to limit not only the state power but also the governmental power and to expand freedoms for all, the AK Party could best alleviate the fears that it is manipulating its electoral successes to install a majoritarian democracy.

Today's Zaman 4.15.2008

A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire

M. Sükrü Hanioglu, Princeton University
Princeton University Press, 2008
Introduction [HTML] or [PDF format]
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At the turn of the nineteenth century, the Ottoman Empire straddled three continents and encompassed extraordinary ethnic and cultural diversity among the estimated thirty million people living within its borders. It was perhaps the most cosmopolitan state in the world--and possibly the most volatile. A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire now gives scholars and general readers a concise history of the late empire between 1789 and 1918, turbulent years marked by incredible social change.

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Moving past standard treatments of the subject, M. Sükrü Hanioglu emphasizes broad historical trends and processes more than single events. He examines the imperial struggle to centralize amid powerful opposition from local rulers, nationalist and other groups, and foreign powers. He looks closely at the socioeconomic changes this struggle wrought and addresses the Ottoman response to the challenges of modernity. Hanioglu shows how this history is not only essential to comprehending modern Turkey, but is integral to the histories of Europe and the world. He brings Ottoman society marvelously to life in all its facets--cultural, diplomatic, intellectual, literary, military, and political--and he mines imperial archives and other documents from the period to describe it as it actually was, not as it has been portrayed in postimperial nationalist narratives. A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire is a must-read for anyone seeking to understand the legacy left in this empire's ruins--a legacy the world still grapples with today.

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M. Sükrü Hanioglu is professor of Near Eastern studies at Princeton University. He is the author of Preparation for a Revolution and The Young Turks in Opposition.

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Endorsements:

"Without doubt the best history of the development of political ideas in the late Ottoman Empire. Haniogluu situates this history of ideas in the context of the political and diplomatic history of the empire as well as in the history of European political thought, of which he demonstrates a deep knowledge."--Erik J. Zürcher, author of Turkey: A Modern History

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"A significant contribution, not only to the historiography of the late Ottoman Empire but also to the field of comparative studies of empires."--Fikret Adanir, coeditor of The Ottomans and the Balkans

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Table of Contents:

List of Figures ix
Acknowledgments xi
Note on Transliteration, Place Names, and Dates xiii
Introduction 1
Chapter 1: The Ottoman Empire at the Turn of the Nineteenth Century 6
Chapter 2: Initial Ottoman Responses to the Challenge of Modernity 42
Chapter 3: The Dawn of the Age of Reform 55
Chapter 4: The Tanzimat Era 72
Chapter 5: The Twilight of the Tanzimat and the Hamidian Regime 109
Chapter 6: From Revolution to Imperial Collapse: The Longest Decade of the Late Ottoman Empire 150
Conclusion 203
Further Reading in Major European Languages 213
Bibliography 217
Index 231

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Subject Areas:

• Middle Eastern Studies
• World History / Comparative History

http://press.princeton.edu/titles/8639.html
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The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy: A Realist Perspective

Growing links in energy and geopolitics between China, Russia, Central Asia and the Gulf

Mehmet Öğütçü and Xin Ma [1]

Overview

China’s dependency on imported energy has surged in recent years and is expected to grow at a similar or increasing rate in the coming decades, driven by an unprecedented industrialization mobilization and urbanization process. As a result, the Chinese leadership feels increasingly insecure and vulnerable as greater dependency has exposed the country to the risks of global supply disruptions, chronic instability in energy exporting regions, and the vagaries of global energy geopolitics. As access to sustainable and secure energy at a reasonable cost is perceived by the leadership as critical for China’s continued development, political endurance, and social stability, energy issue has become a matter of “high politics” of national security and no longer just the “low politics” of domestic energy policy[2].

Securing energy resources is no doubt a highly political matter. This was the case for Japan before the Second World War. It is also the case for China today with its growing energy demand. Just like other governments with a long history of central planning economy, the Chinese government believes that security is too important to be left entirely to the markets. Instead, it combines government approaches with market measures to secure the needed energy as demonstrated by the ambitious shopping behavior of the Chinese national oil companies and the high profile energy diplomacy, conducted by the government. This is undoubtedly going to have a profound impact on the international market, particularly on the major energy exporters, namely the Gulf, the CIS, and Africa.

This paper attempts to analyse the expanding energy linkages of China, one of the most dynamic major consumers, with the Middle East, a leading petroleum producer and the CIS, a core non-OPEC emerging producer, not only because they are well established oil exporting regions, but also because of their geopolitical relevance to China as key players in a possible energy corridor linking China with the Gulf at some point in the future. The paper concludes that the economics and geopolitics of energy supply for China dictate different approaches to each of these regions, with the CIS territory ensuring its energy to be transported across the ocean where China could be vulnerable to potential maritime disruption in the event of serious international disputes, and with the Gulf offering more flexible commercial arrangements.

China takes different economic and geopolitical approaches towards Russia and the Central Asian/Caspian producers. Compared to Russia, seen as relatively unreliable, Central Asian hydrocarbon resources seem more promising and feasible for China, although funding problems and political calculations plaguing all pipeline projects offer no exception[3] Furthermore, China’s extending its Central Asian land routes from Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan and then down to northern Iran is seen as a visionary Sino-Arabic oil passage to the Gulf ports[4]. China is also willing to join the northern line transportation for its expected stake in Siberia and the Russian Far East, by some oil swap options between China, Kazakhstan and Russia. Similar natural gas projects are under work or consideration linking China to Central Asia and Russia.

These corridors could eventually position the Middle Kingdom at the centre of a "Pan-Asian Global Energy Bridge" that will connect existing and potential suppliers to Asia (i.e., the Gulf, Central Asia, and Russia) with the key consumers (China, Japan and Korea). If successfully implemented, this will not only largely improve the energy security of China, but also will enhance Beijing’s geopolitical influence in this geography.

As the international energy sector has undergone significant changes since the beginning of this century, due to the emergence of new players and the changing of dynamics among all players, the resultant energy scene requires adjustments to make room for new players in the marketplace and develop effective, “win-win”, collaborative mechanisms to promote confidence. Energy security concerns need to be addressed from the standpoints of both consumers and producers. Otherwise, geopolitical rivalry and tough competition for scarce resources will likely intensify, leading to “zero-sum” confrontations.

Changing dynamics in international petroleum sector

The pattern of international petroleum sector is under serious transformation due to the emergence of new powers, such as China, or old players being equipped with new powers, such as Russia, Central Asian countries and the Gulf countries, and an increasing concern of energy security from both consumer and producer perspective. The changing nature of the international petroleum market thus requires new rebalanced mechanisms, and new forms of partnerships among players.[5] These major consumers and producers are interacting with each other, taking active measures to conduct energy diplomacy, establishing new strategic partnerships with a view to changing rules in a way that will better serve their national interests.

The profound changes in world energy, still underway, could be summed up as follows:

First, the increased international petroleum prices have, together with many other factors, shifted power significantly to oil producing countries, especially a few large ones, where the majority of remaining reserves are located, such as the Gulf, Russia, and Central Asia[6]. This power, coupled with the huge financial assets accumulated by those producers in a high price environment, has fuelled the international ambitions of these countries to seek changing or reshaping the traditional rules of the game for the benefit of their national interests.[7] Some of them, such as Russia, not only host large share of world petroleum reserves, but also has the political will to use energy as an instrument to advance its economic and political interests.[8] Aware of their increasing power, many of the resource-rich countries have either re-nationalised their oil industries or established strategic control through further transfer of power into the hands of governments.[9]

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Full-text of the paper is available, click here. (pdf, 42 pages)

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The Reflection Cafe thanks to the authors for their permission to re-publish this article in the Cafe. The article has been published earlier in Insight Turkey:

http://www.insightturkey.com/currentissue.htm / http://www.insightturkey.com/is0903.htm

[1] This paper represents the authors’ personal views and not those of any organisation they are associated with.

Mehmet Ögütçü, former Turkish diplomat, senior OECD/IEA staff in Paris, an International Board member of the Windsor Energy Group, and currently with BG Group in London. He is the author of numerous books including, inter alia, “China’s Quest World-wide for Energy Security” (IEA, 2000), “Eurasian Energy Prospects and Politics: Need for a Western Strategy” (Energy Charter Treaty, 1994), “Asian Energy Security Concerns and Geopolitical Implications for the Middle East, the Indian Ocean and the Central Asia” (IDSA New Delhi: February 2003), “China’s Regional Development and FDI”, (OECD,2004), “International Investment for Development” (OECD, 2005), “Does Our Future Lay with Asia” (1998, Milliyet Publishing) and “2023 Turkey Roadmap” (Etkilesim Publishing, 2007). He can be contacted at ogutcudunya@yahoo.co.uk

Xin Ma, a researcher and doctoral candidate at Centre for Energy, Petroleum and Mineral Law and Policy at the University of Dundee, has a Master degree on management engineering at University of Petroleum (China). She spent four years working at PetroChina Ltd. The focus of her current research is National Oil Company reforms and the impact to commercial efficiency. She can be contacted at x.ma@dundee.ac.uk

[2] China's quest for energy security since its becoming a net crude importer in 1993 and dethroning Japan as the world’s second largest consumer of oil a decade later has driven the Middle Kingdom to the world’s principal hydrocarbon producing and exporting regions.

[3] Petroconsultants, October 1998, p.51. G. Kemp, R. Harkavy, Strategic Geography and the Changing Middle East (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1997), p. 131.

[4] Xiaojie Xu, “The Oil and Gas Links between Central Asia and China: A Geopolitical Perspective”, OPEC Review, Vol. XXIII No.1, March 1999, p.48.

[5] Ernst&Young (2007). Partnership in the Oil and Gas Sector: New Models, New Agendas 1-19. P3 Mandil, C. (2007). The Energy Future International Oil and Gas: Financial Review 2007. M. Crisell, Euromoney International Investor PLC 1-3. P1

[6] Despite four years of high oil prices, market tightness is likely to increase beyond 2010 as global oil demand will grow from an annual 2 percent average over the next five years to 2.2 percent. The increase will largely be caused by faster growth in Asia and the Middle East. At the same time, non-OPEC supply will decrease, partly because of delays on major oil projects but also because supplies are nearing a peak. While biofuel production is expected to double over the next few years, it will still only account for 2 percent of global oil supplies by 2012.

[7] Mandil, C. (2007). The Energy Future International Oil and Gas: Financial Review 2007. M. Crisell, Euromoney International Investor PLC 1-3.P1

[8] Lo, B. and A. Rothman (2006). China and Russia: Common Interests, Contrasting Perceptions Asia Pacific Strategy, Asian Geopolitics Special Report, CLSA Asia-Pacific Markets: 1-31.P13, 21

[9] See “The new seven sisters: oil and gas giants that dwarf the west’s top producers”, Financial Times, March 12, 2007. A recent study measuring the shift in power in global energy markets revealed that seven major state controlled energy corporations from non-OECD countries (i.e. Saudi Aramco, Gazprom, PDVSA, China’s CNPC, Iran’s NIOC, Petrobras of Brazil and Petronas of Malaysia) presently control over 30 percent of global oil and gas production and over 30 percent of reserves, while the original seven (now four) OECD-based energy blue chips which have dominated global energy markets since World War II (i.e. ExxonMobil, BP, Chevron, Shell) now control just 10 percent of production and 3 percent of reserves.

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Israel's "Bigger Holocaust" Threat Against the Palestinians

Omar Barghouti
ZNet / March 2, 2008

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Yesterday, Friday, 29 February 2008, Israel's deputy defense minister Matan Vilnai threatened Palestinians in Gaza with a "holocaust," telling the Israeli Army Radio: "The more Qassam fire intensifies and the rockets reach a longer range, [the Palestinians] will bring upon themselves a bigger holocaust because we will use all our might to defend ourselves."[1] This date will go down in history as the beginning of a new phase in the colonial conflict between Israel and the Palestinians, whereby a senior Israeli leader, a "leftist" for that matter, has publicly revealed the genocidal plans Israel is considering to implement against Palestinians under its military occupation, if they do not cease to resist its dictates. It will also mark the first time since World War II that any state has relentlessly -- and on live TV -- terrorized a civilian population with acts of slow, or low-intensity, genocide, with one of its senior government officials overtly inciting to a full-blown "Holocaust," while the world stood by, watching in utter apathy, or in glee, as in the case of leading western leaders.

For an Israeli leader who is Jewish, in particular, to threaten anyone with Holocaust is a sad irony of history. Are victims of unspeakable crimes invariably doomed to turn into appalling criminals? Can anything be possibly done to break this vicious cycle, before the state that claims to represent the main victims of the Holocaust commits a fresh Holocaust itself?

Before addressing those questions, however, isn't it exaggerated and pointedly counterproductive, one may ask, to compare Israel's crimes against the Palestinians, no matter how brutal and inhumane they have been, to Nazi genocide? Besides, isn't each crime unique and worthy of attention in its own right as a violation of human rights, of international law, of universal moral principles? The answer is yes; each crime is unique, and nothing Israel has done to date comes even close, in quantity, to Nazi crimes. But when victims-turned-perpetrators openly admit their intentions to carry out a unique form of offense that they are most familiar with, and they actually commit repeated acts that are qualitatively reminiscent of that crime in their unbridled racism and the ghastly level of disregard for the value and dignity of the human life of the "other" that is inherent in them, then their threats ought to be taken seriously. Everyone is called upon to react, to act in any way to stop this crime-in-progress from reaching its logical conclusion.

The Ramallah-based Palestinian Authority, despite its lack of political independence and its disputed mandate, is called upon to immediately exonerate itself from the popular accusation of complicity. Azmi Bishara was among the most prominent of those who issued this harsh indictment, in reaction to the announcement by the head of the PA in Cairo, just a day before the latest Israeli massacre in Gaza, that Al-Qaida had infiltrated Gaza, and that the projectiles fired indiscriminately by the Palestinian resistance at Israeli towns and settlements provide the excuse for Israel's aggression. The credibility of this complicity assertion was compelling enough to prompt Mahmoud Abbas to condemn the Israeli crime in unprecedented austerity and hyperbole, describing it as "more than a Holocaust." [2]

Arab regimes, especially Egypt's and Jordan's, as unelected, illegitimate and subservient to the US as they may be, are still expected to distance themselves from Israel's lethal war of aggression on Gaza. After all, their continued diplomatic and commercial ties with Israel, as well as their implicit justification of Israel's crimes through their repeated and gratuitous vilification of Hamas, have convincingly labeled them in the eyes of their respective publics, not to mention the wider Arab public, as accessories in crime.

European governments, chiefly in France, Britain and Germany, have to also answer to the serious charge of collusion in Israel's crimes against humanity, prevalent among wide Palestinian, Arab and Muslim majorities. They have not only stayed silent in the face of Israel's willful killing [3] of almost 100 innocent civilians, many of whom are children, in the course of the last few days in Gaza; they have continued to treat Israel with reverence, celebrating its so-called 60^th anniversary, a gruesome event of ethnic cleansing and colonial ruin itself, showering it with economic, political and scientific support that significantly contributes to its impunity.

The US government, on the other hand, cannot be accused of abetting Israel's acts of genocide in the same league as all the above sinister accomplices. It is and has always been a full and proud partner in planning, bankrolling and executing those crimes against the Palestinians, not to mention its own unmatched criminal record in Afghanistan, Iraq and, before both, Vietnam. When our own Nuremberg moment arrives, when Israeli war criminals are finally prosecuted in an international court, a substantial space in the defense chamber will have to be reserved for US commanders and political leaders. Without American partnership, expressed in immeasurable military, economic and diplomatic aid, Israel could not have committed all its racist and colonial crimes with such impunity.

Going back to the question of whether anything should and could be done to stop Israel, the answer is a certain yes. South African apartheid crimes were challenged not only by the heroic struggle of the oppressed masses on the ground in South Africa; they were also fought by worldwide campaigns of boycott, divestment and sanctions against the regime, with all its complicit economic, academic, cultural, and athletic institutions. Similarly, international civil society can, and ought to, apply the same measures of non-violent justice to bring about Israel's compliance with international law and basic human rights. Even the threat of sanctions has proven effective enough in the past to halt Israel's repeated campaigns of death and devastation.

If all those images of tens of Palestinian children torn to pieces, all those recurrent episodes of wanton killing and destruction by an occupation army against a predominantly defenseless civilian population, go unpunished, the world may well witness a new Holocaust indeed.

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* Omar Barghouti is an independent political analyst

[1] http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/959532.html

[2] http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/0C8EBD66-032E-4470-82FB-005D6A2B5186.htm

[3] http://www.alhaq.org/etemplate.php?id=352

Sufism: The Formative Period

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Ahmet Karamustafa
Washington University - St. Louis

University of California Press, 2007
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"Karamustafa's new work is easily the best book I've read on the subject of early Sufism. The author does a fine job of combining analysis with synthesis, and he incorporates into his historical overview a generous sampling of the stories of a significant number of major characters. Perhaps the greatest achievement is Karamustafa's skill in making an immensely complex and potentially amorphous topic understandable. He manages to weave together very accessibly strands of history from diverse cultural and historical contexts across the central middle east, but the narrative remains concrete and avoids indulging more than necessary in discussing 'theoretical' issues. This is a very thoughtful treatment and I believe it will make a wonderful contribution toward a more integrated, comprehensive understanding of one of the most interesting subjects in late antique/early medieval Islamic religious history."--John Renard, St. Louis University

"Ahmet Karamustafa's Sufism: The Formative Period is an absorbing and persuasive presentation of the development of Sufism, based on a thorough mastery of the original sources and epitomizing the discoveries of modern scholarship. Students of Sufism and religious studies will welcome this important contribution to Islamic studies."--Carl W. Ernst, William R. Kenan, Jr., Distinguished Professor of Religious Studies, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill

"Concisely and efficiently, Ahmet Karamustafa presents us with a survey of the early development of Sufism that is at once analytic and informative, and fully attentive to social and intellectual as well as purely religious concerns. It supersedes all previous overviews of the formative period of Sufi thought and institutions."--Hamid Algar, University of California, Berkeley

"Leaving behind the more speculative approaches to Sufism and Islam of an earlier generation, and based on a comprehensive review of the most recent results of international scholarship in the field, including the author's own original research work, this book provides a highly informative and objective historical overview of the main mystical movements that contributed significantly to the shaping of medieval Muslim society. Elegantly written, it is a must for all those concerned."--Dr. Hermann Landolt, McGill University, Montreal and Institute of Ismaili Studies, London

DESCRIPTION

Ahmet T. Karamustafa bases this study on a fresh reading of the primary sources and, by integrating the findings of recent scholarship on the subject, presents a unified narrative of Sufism's historical development. His innovative analytical framework reveals the emergence of mystical currents in Islam during the ninth century and traces the rapid spread of Iraq-based Sufism to other regions of the Islamic world, providing an integrated, comprehensive understanding of one of the most compelling aspects of late antique, early medieval Islamic religious history.
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Copub: Edinburgh University Press

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Ahmet T. Karamustafa is Associate Professor of History and Religious Studies at Washington University in St. Louis. He is the author of God's Unruly Friends: Dervish Groups in the Islamic Later Middle Period, 1200-1550 (1994) and Vahidi's Menakib-i Hvoca-i Cihan ve Netice-i Can: Critical Edition and Historical Analysis (1993), and co-editor of Cartography in the Traditional Islamic and South Asian Societies (1992).

http://www.ucpress.edu/books/pages/10957.html

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Why Hasn't the World's Lone Superpower Stopped Tragedy in Lebanon?

Abdullah Gül, Foreign Minister of Turkey

An Appeal for Leadership: Why Hasn't the World's Lone Superpower Stopped This Tragedy?

The Washington Post, August 3, 2006

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ANKARA, Turkey -- The grave tragedy that has been unfolding before our eyes in Lebanon, and the inability of the international community to bring it to an end after three weeks of suffering, unfortunately raise questions about the United States and its proud legacy of leadership for freedom and justice.

After all, my generation grew up with an image of the United States as standing for the revered values of democracy. It is sad that this image of a "kinder, gentler nation" is being tarnished as millions around the world watch in complete horror as events unfold in Lebanon.

Today live images of the carnage and destruction are broadcast directly into our households. Each time a bomb wreaks havoc on the streets of Beirut, it hits the consciences of people everywhere.

Throughout the world, the same question is being asked: Why has the sole superpower, which alone has the capability to stop this tragedy, turned a blind eye to the images of human suffering and a deaf ear to the cries for mercy?

The hopes for the democratic transformation of the Middle East that we, together with the United States and other allies, have been painstakingly attempting to cultivate are being shattered, along with the lives of the people of the region.

Does anyone have the right to allow this to happen: the creation of a deep sense of indignation that will inevitably leave responsible governments with the difficult task of managing justifiably outraged public opinion -- at a time when radicals and fanatics are looking for pretexts to justify their actions and to widen their influence?

Needless to say, this does not bode well for the much-needed dialogue and understanding between civilizations.

Retaining the higher moral ground is even more essential in the age of instant information. It is time for all of us to act upon what our collective conscience has been telling us for many days.

In Lebanon we have once again seen the limitations of our classic notions of security in the face of asymmetric challenges. The reality is that the use of disproportionate and indiscriminate force makes difficult situations even more intractable without enhancing anyone's security. In fact, if we take the long view, it will be seen that the reverse is happening.

The only way out of the present crisis is determined action by the international community that truly addresses the core issues that have been festering in the Middle East and that lie at the very roots of the conflict. This requires nothing less than genuine leadership, which must adhere to the values that it asks of others in order to be effective.

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http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/08/02/AR2006080201389.html

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Middle East, Central Asia, Russia, Balkans (II)

Middle East
In the Mideast, the Third Way is a Myth, Shibley Telhami
American Thinking About Violence in the Middle East , Alan Richards
Iraq: The Logic of Disengagement , Edward N. Luttwak
The Kurdish Question and Turkey's Justice and Development Party, Hakan Yavuz & A.Nihat Ozcan
The Turkish Alternative to Christian Democracy? The Importance of the AKP , Ziya Onis
What Turkey's EU Entry Means for the Middle East, Ibrahim Al-Marashi
The 2006 Middle East & Central Asia Politics, Economics, and Society Conference , Univ. of Utah
21st Annual Middle East History and Theory Conference , University of Chicago
Thirteenth Annual Central Eurasian Studies Conference Program, Indiana Univ.-Bloomington
The Palestinians' New Dynamic , Shibley Telhami
Prominent Egyptian Human Rights Activist Looks on the Bright Side of the Middle East , Leslie Evans
Who's Afraid of Islamic Government? , William O. Beeman
Beyond Liberalization?, Daniel Brumberg
What Went Wrong in Iraq and Prospects for Democracy and Stability , Larry Diamond
Iran and the US: A Mystic and Poetic Path to Conflict Resolution and Peace Making, Kamran Mofid
Democracy and Iran , Open Democracy

Mahmud Ahmadinejad's Letter to George W. Bush

Caucasia, Central Asia, Russsia, Balkans
Central Asia: The New Heartland, Harvard International Review
Turkey and Russia: Axis of the Excluded? , Fiona Hill & Omer Taspinar
Russia and Turkey in the Caucasus: Moving Together to Preserve the Status Quo?, Fiona Hill & Omer Taspinar
Turkey Stands to Benefit from Caspian Basin Energy Competition, Igor Torbakov

Religion and Identity in Modern Russia: The Revival of Orthodoxy and Islam, J. Johnson , M. Stepaniants and B. Forest
Central Asian Gateway Portal
Directory of Think Tanks , Central Asian Gateway
Kafkasya ve Türk Kültürü Üzerine Sosyal ve Stratejik Araştırmalar
Caucasian Journal of European Affairs
Central Asia's Second Chance, Martha Brill Olcott
Eurasia in Balance: The US and the Regional Power Shift, Ariel Cohen
Kyrgyzstan: Freedom of Speech Comes and Goes , Meri Asekova
Revival of Cultural and Islamic Legacy in Tatarstan, Talip Kucukcan

Lectures on Central Asia, H.B.Paksoy
Iran's Relations with Central Asia: A Strategic Analysis , Simbal A. Khan
Religious and National Idenity Among the Balkan Muslims , Baskin Oran

Breaking Out Of The Balkan Ghetto: Why IPA Should Be Changed, ESI

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Middle East, Central Asia, Russia, Balkans (I), The Reflection Cafe

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Being Modern in the Middle East: